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January 15, 1966: The Coup We Thought We Knew. By Nworisa Michael

 

Major Chukwuma Kaduna Nzeogwu (In middle addressing the Press)
Monday 24th, Aug; 2026

By Editor 

#TheNworisaDoctrine 

For decades, many Nigerians have grown up with a simple description of January 15, 1966: the Igbo coup. The story is familiar: Igbo military officers overthrew Nigeria's First Republic, killed prominent Northern and Western leaders, and an Igbo officer, Major-General Johnson Aguiyi-Ironsi, eventually emerged as Head of State. The anger that followed in the North then became part of the chain of events that eventually led to the Nigerian Civil War. 

But what if the story is more complicated than the label suggests? This is not an attempt to excuse the coup. It was an unconstitutional seizure of power, and the killing of political leaders and military officers cannot be justified by whatever grievances the plotters had against Nigeria's political class. But if we genuinely want to understand how Nigeria moved from January 15 to the Civil War, we have to look beyond the label and examine what actually happened. 

By January 1966, Nigeria's young democracy was already in serious trouble. The 1964 federal election had been bitterly disputed, while the Western Region had descended into political violence following the controversial 1965 election. Homes were burned, political opponents were attacked and the crisis popularly remembered as “Operation Wetie” demonstrated just how badly the political system was deteriorating. To some young military officers, the politicians appeared incapable of resolving the problems they had created. 

Among those who eventually plotted the coup were Major Chukwuma Kaduna Nzeogwu, Major Emmanuel Ifeajuna and Major Adewale Ademoyega. Nzeogwu and Ifeajuna were Igbo, while Ademoyega was Yoruba. The wider group of officers involved was also not exclusively Igbo. This does not mean ethnicity had nothing to do with how the coup unfolded or how it was later perceived, but it does make the simple description of the operation as an exclusively Igbo conspiracy much harder to sustain. 

And then there is the part of the story that many Nigerians may never have heard. 

One of the reported intentions of the plotters was to release Chief Obafemi Awolowo, who was then serving a prison sentence, and bring him into the new political arrangement. Major Ademoyega's account, as one of the principal planners, contains the Awolowo connection, and other historical accounts have also referred to the plan. This does not mean Awolowo planned or authorised the coup. It means that at least some of the plotters were thinking beyond simply handing Nigeria to an Igbo government. 

That raises an important question: if the plotters' intentions were more complicated, how did January 15 become remembered as an “Igbo coup”? 

Part of the answer lies in who was killed and what happened afterward. 

Sir Ahmadu Bello, the Sardauna of Sokoto and Premier of Northern Nigeria, was killed. Prime Minister Abubakar Tafawa Balewa was killed. Several senior Northern military officers were killed. In the West, Premier Samuel Ladoke Akintola was also killed. Yet the coup itself did not completely succeed. The operation in Lagos failed to achieve all its objectives, and Major-General Aguiyi-Ironsi survived. 

Eventually, Ironsi emerged as Head of State. 

Ironsi was Igbo. 

Whatever the original intentions of the plotters, this was now the reality Nigerians had to interpret. Imagine how the events looked from the perspective of a Northern Nigerian who had just watched Ahmadu Bello, Balewa and several senior Northern officers murdered, only to see an Igbo military officer emerge at the centre of the new government. To many, the pattern appeared unmistakably ethnic. 

The distinction between who planned the coup, who carried out particular killings, who ultimately took power and how the public interpreted the events became almost impossible to maintain. The actions of a relatively small group of military officers increasingly became associated with an entire ethnic group. 

Ironsi's subsequent policies made matters even more complicated. His government introduced Decree No. 34, which sought to replace the existing federal structure of the civil service with a unified system. From one perspective, centralisation was an attempt to eliminate the regional divisions that had contributed to Nigeria's political crisis. But coming only months after the deaths of the Northern political leadership, it was interpreted by many Northerners as confirmation of their fears that the North had lost its political power to an Igbo-led central government. 

Whether that interpretation was completely fair is another question. But political history is shaped not only by what leaders intend; it is also shaped by what people believe those intentions to be. 

On July 29, 1966, Northern military officers launched a counter-coup. Ironsi was killed alongside Lieutenant-Colonel Adekunle Fajuyi, the Yoruba military governor of the Western Region who had refused to abandon him. What followed was even more devastating: violence spread against Igbo people and other Eastern Nigerians living in parts of the North. Thousands were killed, families were displaced and people who had spent decades building lives outside their ancestral homes began returning East because they no longer felt safe. 

The anger created by the deaths of Northern leaders was understandable as an emotional reaction to an extraordinary political crime. The retaliation against innocent civilians, however, was neither justice nor a legitimate response to the coup. 

An Igbo trader in Kano did not kill Ahmadu Bello. An Igbo child born in Kaduna did not overthrow Nigeria's government. An Igbo railway worker did not design the coup. Yet an entire population increasingly became associated with the actions of a relatively small group of military officers. 

That was one of the great tragedies of 1966: individual responsibility was replaced by collective blame. 

From there, trust between the regions deteriorated rapidly. The massacres and mass displacement deepened the belief in the East that Igbo lives could no longer be guaranteed within Nigeria. Political negotiations failed, the country was restructured into states, and eventually Lt. Col. Odumegwu Ojukwu declared the independence of Biafra. On July 6, 1967, the Federal Government began military operations, marking the formal beginning of the Civil War. 

Nigeria's Civil War was therefore not born from one event. It emerged from a succession of political failures, killings, fears, retaliations and broken trust. 

This is why perhaps we need to be more careful about the history we pass to the next generation. Saying that January 1966 was more complicated than the phrase “Igbo coup” does not mean celebrating the coup or denying the deaths of the Northern and Western leaders. It means refusing to turn the actions of individuals into the guilt of an entire people. 

We can condemn the coup without condemning the Igbo. We can remember Ahmadu Bello and Tafawa Balewa without justifying the killing of innocent Eastern Nigerians. We can acknowledge the legitimate anger of people who lost their leaders without accepting collective punishment as justice. 

The young Nigerians alive today did not choose what their grandparents did in 1966. We cannot change what happened, but we can decide what we inherit from it. 

We can inherit the facts without inheriting the hatred. 

Perhaps that is the history of January 15 that Nigeria most needs to remember. 

Nworisa Michael, Department of History & International Studies Northwest University, Kano. Coordinator of Inter-tribe Community Support Forum. Writes from Nworisamichael1917@gmail.com 

#TheNworisaDoctrine is a body of ideas centred on nation-building, civic responsibility, inclusive governance and African self-determination.

What If Nigeria Had a DRUM for Every Tribe? By Nworisa Michael

Sunday 23rd, Aug; 2026

By Editor

#TheNworisaDoctrine 

There was a time when Nigeria did not have social media, WhatsApp groups or hundreds of online platforms competing every day to tell us who we are. Yet Nigerians were reading stories about themselves, about one another and about the society they were building. One of the publications that captured that era was DRUM. 

DRUM was not originally a Nigerian magazine. It emerged from South Africa in 1951 and eventually developed regional editions across Africa, including Nigeria. The Nigerian edition ran for decades and became an important record of Nigerian society, combining politics with photography, culture, fashion, music, sport, personalities and the ordinary experiences of African life. 

What fascinates me about DRUM today is not simply the magazine itself, but the question it leaves behind: what if Nigeria had a DRUM for every tribe? 

Imagine a publication whose purpose was not to tell us which tribe was better, whose politician was superior or whose grievance was greater, but to allow Nigerians to discover one another beyond the stereotypes we have inherited. 

Imagine an Igbo reader opening a story about an extraordinary Hausa entrepreneur in Kano. A Hausa reader discovering the history of an Ikwerre community in Rivers State. A Yoruba reader learning about the traditions of the Tiv. A young Nigerian in Kano discovering the story of a family from Cross River living and contributing to the city. Not as strangers. Not as statistics. But as people. 

That is one thing we sometimes underestimate about storytelling: you find it much harder to hate what you have taken the time to understand. 

DRUM documented political events, but it also documented people. It showed African societies through their fashion, music, relationships, ambitions, struggles, personalities and everyday lives. Its regional editions were not simply copies of one another; much of their content was locally produced for their respective audiences. 

That is the part of its legacy I think deserves to be revisited today. 

Nigeria has become extremely good at telling stories about conflict. We tell stories about who killed whom, which tribe did what, which region is marginalised and which politician belongs to which ethnic camp. Our social media algorithms reward outrage because outrage travels faster than understanding. 

But what if we deliberately built platforms that made Nigerians curious about Nigerians? 

What if alongside the political arguments, we documented the Igbo trader who has spent 30 years building a business in Kano? What if we told the story of the Hausa family that opened its home to neighbours from another part of the country? What if we documented the Yoruba teacher, the Ijaw entrepreneur, the Tiv farmer, the Kanuri student, the Nupe artisan and the Ikwerre professional not merely as representatives of their tribes, but as Nigerians whose individual stories form part of our collective story? 

Perhaps we would gradually begin to realise something that political arguments often make us forget: Nigeria is not only a country of 250 ethnic groups. It is a country of millions of individual stories constantly crossing those ethnic boundaries. 

And this is why I find the DRUM archive so fascinating today. We now have access to thousands of pages documenting African life from decades ago. Archivi.ng has digitised more than 3,000 pages of DRUM from the 1960s and 1970s, while the West African DRUM archive now being preserved by MOWAA contains more than 1,000 editions from Nigeria and Ghana. 

We can therefore look backwards and ask ourselves what we have lost. 

We have never lacked people willing to speak for their tribes. What we have lacked is enough people willing to tell the story of other people's tribes with the same dignity with which they tell their own. 

Maybe that is the DRUM we need today. 

Not a magazine that tells us that our differences do not exist. They do. 

Not a platform that pretends Nigeria has no grievances, injustices or difficult histories. We do. 

But a platform that says that before we reduce one another to a tribe, a religion, a political party or an accent, there is a human being whose story is worth knowing. 

Perhaps Nigeria does not need another platform for Nigerians to shout at one another. 

Perhaps we need more platforms that make us meet one another. 

What if Nigeria had a DRUM for every tribe? 

Maybe we would finally begin to hear the music of the whole country. 

Nworisa Michael is the coordinator of Inter-tribe Community Support Forum and writes from nworisamichael1917@gmail.com 

#TheNworisaDoctrine  a body of ideas centred on nation-building, civic responsibility, inclusive governance and African self-determination.


BEFORE THE WAR: THE COMMUNITY THAT FOUND A HOME IN KANO. By Nworisa Michael

 

#TheNworisaDoctrine 

If you walk through Sabon Gari in Kano today, it is easy to see it simply as one of the city's busiest commercial areas. Behind the shops, streets, churches, businesses and endless movement of people, however, is a story that goes back more than a century. It is a story about migration, opportunity and the making of a community and, perhaps surprisingly to many Nigerians today, it is also an important part of the history of the Igbo people in Kano. 

During the colonial period, Southern Nigerians began moving north in search of work, trade and business opportunities. Kano, already one of West Africa's great commercial centres, naturally attracted many of them. To accommodate these growing migrant communities, the colonial authorities developed what became known as Sabon Gari “new town” in Hausa. 

It is sometimes easy, looking back from today's Nigeria, to assume that Sabon Gari was simply created as an ethnic enclosure. The reality was more nuanced. The colonial administration was deliberately organising different parts of the growing city according to the roles, backgrounds and lifestyles of the people living in them. Sabon Gari was developed largely for migrants from Southern Nigeria who came to Kano for work, trade and other opportunities. 

In much the same manner, areas such as Nasarawa GRA were laid out to provide residential environments suited to European colonial officials and the lifestyle they were accustomed to back home in Europe spacious compounds, generous setbacks, gardens and an environment designed around their residential preferences. This is why, even today, one can notice the spacious compounds and garden-filled yards characteristic of some of the older parts of Nasarawa. 

So, the story of Sabon Gari should be understood within that larger colonial arrangement. There was certainly an element of colonial segregation in the way Kano was planned, but Sabon Gari was also a response to a very practical reality: people from different parts of colonial Nigeria were increasingly coming to Kano to work, trade and settle. And among those migrants, the Igbo would eventually become one of the largest and most influential communities. 

Initially, the Yoruba were more numerous among the Southern migrants in Sabon Gari. But after the Second World War, Igbo migration to Kano increased considerably. By the middle of the 1950s, historical research estimates that about 59 percent of Sabon Gari's population was Igbo, while the Yoruba accounted for about 24 percent. 

Think about what that means. A significant part of Kano's story was being written by people whose ancestral homes were thousands of kilometres away. These were not simply visitors passing through Kano. Many came to stay. Some came alone and later brought their families; others were born there. Their children attended school there, grew up there and knew Kano as home.  

The popular image is often that the Igbo came to northern cities simply to do business. Business was certainly important, but they were also railway workers, civil servants, employees of companies, artisans, professionals and entrepreneurs. Kano's growing economy provided opportunities, and many Igbo migrants established themselves firmly within the city's commercial and professional life. 

Sabon Gari became particularly important to this economic story. By the 1960s, its market had grown into one of Kano's significant commercial centres, and historical research describes it as an important centre of Igbo commercial activity. But perhaps the more interesting part of the story is what happened beyond the marketplace: they began building a community. 

The Igbo residents did not simply arrive in Kano and live as isolated individuals. They formed associations to look after one another. The Igbo Union had branches across Nigeria, including Kano, and its presence there became well established by the 1940s. These organisations helped newcomers settle, supported members during difficult times, assisted families during marriages and funerals, provided financial assistance and helped create a sense of community far from their ancestral homes. 

The community also invested in education. Before 1966, the Igbo community in Kano had established both a primary and secondary school for its children. This tells us something important about the nature of their settlement. They were not merely temporary traders passing through a northern city, they were putting down roots, raising families and building institutions that suggested they expected to remain part of Kano's future. 

Imagine a young Igbo man arriving in Kano several decades ago. He finds his way to Sabon Gari and meets people from his community. Perhaps someone helps him find accommodation or introduces him to a business opportunity. He starts small, maybe by opening a shop, working for the railway or finding employment with a company. Eventually, he brings his family. His children are born in Kano, attend school in Kano and grow up around Hausa neighbours and other Nigerians from different parts of the country. At some point, Kano stops being simply the place where their father came to make a living. It becomes home. 

By the 1960s, some of these migrants were already second-generation residents  people born and raised in Kano who had never known another home. 

Nigeria entered one of the darkest periods in its history. The January 1966 coup, the political crisis that followed, the counter-coup and the growing suspicion between Nigeria's regions created an atmosphere in which ethnicity became increasingly dangerous. The violence that followed in Northern Nigeria affected Igbo communities severely, and Kano was among the places where the violence was particularly devastating. 

The attacks reached Sabon Gari. People who had spent decades building businesses, friendships and families in Kano suddenly found themselves running for their lives. Some abandoned their shops, some left their homes, and some never returned. The population of Igbo residents in Sabon Gari fell dramatically in 1966, and during the Civil War many of those who remained were forced into hiding or disguise. 

It is one of those moments in Nigerian history that deserves to be remembered not simply through statistics, but through the human beings behind them. Imagine being born in Kano, growing up in Kano and building your entire livelihood in Kano and then being made to feel, by circumstances you did not create, that you were suddenly a stranger. 

The war ended, Nigeria remained one country, and gradually Igbo Nigerians began returning to Kano. They reopened businesses, rebuilt their lives and returned to the streets and markets they had once known. Sabon Gari once again became an important centre of Igbo life in Kano. 

Over the decades, the community expanded beyond Sabon Gari. Historical research from the 1990s records Igbo residents living in areas such as Brigade, Wudil, Bompai, Nassarawa, Naibawa and Gyadi-Gyadi, among others. The community was no longer confined to one part of the city, it had become part of Kano's wider social and economic landscape. 

Today, if you walk through Kano's commercial areas, you will still find Igbo Nigerians doing many of the things generations before them did trading, working, building businesses, raising families and contributing to the economy. You will find people whose parents came from the East, others who were born in Kano, and young Nigerians who may identify strongly with their Igbo heritage while also considering Kano home. 

That, perhaps, is the most fascinating part of this history. 

It reminds us that long before social media gave us hashtags like #NorthVsSouth, Nigerians were already moving across these geographical boundaries. A man from the East could build a business in Kano, a Yoruba could establish a home in Sabon Gari, a northerner could trade with both. People could speak different languages, worship differently, eat different foods and still participate in the same economy. 

Our history has certainly known conflict, but it has also known coexistence, commerce, friendship, migration and shared dreams. Perhaps that is something worth remembering today, because Nigeria was never built by one tribe. 

Kano was never built by only Kanawa. Lagos was never built by only Yorubas. Onitsha was never built by only Igbos. Our cities became what they are because Nigerians moved, traded, worked, married, learnt from one another and built together. 

Perhaps the Nigeria we need today is not one where everybody becomes the same. Perhaps it is one where an Igbo man can call Kano home, a Hausa man can find opportunity in Enugu, a Yoruba woman can build a life in Maiduguri, and none of them has to prove that they belong before being treated as Nigerian. 

We have lived this way before. Maybe we should remember how. 

This is Nigeria's history. And it belongs to all of us.

Nworisa Michael is the coordinator of Inter-tribe Community Support Forum and writes from nworisamichael1917@gmail.com 

#TheNworisaDoctrine a body of ideas centred on nation-building, civic responsibility, inclusive governance and African self-determination.

Religious Card Politics Will End When Citizens Become Conscious of Nationhood.By Nworisa Michael

Sheikh Yahaya Jingri

 #TheNworisaDoctrine

Religious card politics will come to an end when, this time, it is not merely the government that chooses to move beyond the politics of religious division, but citizens themselves who grow into a consciousness of what truly defines nationhood. The Peace of Westphalia in 1648 marked a major turning point in the evolution of sovereign states and the changing relationship between religious authority and political power. Perhaps Nigeria now needs a similar transformation not imposed from above, but demanded from below by citizens who have become conscious of their common nationhood.

I have followed the reactions from individuals and politicians to the Sheikh Jingri's statement. Interestingly, some of the politicians condemning these statements today are people who, when they held political power, led administrations that had little or no regard for the diversity that defines Nigeria. Yet, as is often typical of political discourse, they have quickly joined the chorus of condemnation against statements that, in one form or another, reflect the very tendencies they once institutionalised or tolerated tendencies that divide us as a people and continue to dwarf our progress towards genuine nationhood.

This is not to excuse anyone's divisive statement. Rather, it is a call for consistency. We cannot condemn the weaponisation of identity only when it is politically convenient and remain silent when the same identity politics serves our own interests.

Sheikh Jingri's statement is one of those expressions we should begin to reconsider as a society. On several occasions, whenever I have had the opportunity to speak on platforms discussing issues of national identity and diversity, I have drawn attention to the word "WAZOBIA." Some of us proudly use the word without considering what it actually communicates.

Have we ever stopped to ask what an Ogoni man in Rivers State feels when we attempt to define him through "Bia"? What does a Tiv person feel when we attach him to an identity that does not represent his history, culture or people? What about the many other ethnic groups whose identities are reduced to labels created from the names or expressions of three dominant groups?

We often say "WAZOBIA" with pride because we have come to associate it with Nigeria's diversity. But perhaps we should also ask whether celebrating diversity requires us to reduce the identities of those who do not fit within those three letters.

The truth is that we are all guilty in one way or another. Sometimes it is the politician who weaponises ethnicity. Sometimes it is the religious leader who turns difference into suspicion. Sometimes it is the ordinary citizen who repeats a stereotype without questioning it. And sometimes it is those of us who condemn identity politics in one context while participating in it in another.

Nationhood requires something greater from us.

Our diversity should not be something we merely tolerate. It should be something we understand, protect and transform into strength. Being Hausa, Igbo, Yoruba, Tiv, Ogoni, Kanuri, Ibibio, Ijaw, Fulani or any of the hundreds of identities that make up Nigeria should not make anyone more or less Nigerian.

The Nigerian identity should not demand that we surrender our ethnic or religious identities. Rather, it should provide a common national identity within which those identities can coexist with dignity.

When citizens begin to understand this, religious and ethnic identity will gradually lose its political value. A politician will find it increasingly difficult to weaponise religion when voters refuse to vote on the basis of religious fear. A religious leader will find it increasingly difficult to divide communities when believers themselves reject the manipulation of their faith for political purposes.

The same applies to ethnicity.

The day Nigerians begin to see diversity not as a barrier to nationhood but as one of the greatest strengths upon which nationhood can be built, it will become increasingly irrelevant for any politician, religious leader or public figure to weaponise our differences for influence.

Perhaps the real revolution Nigeria needs is not simply a change of government. It is a change in consciousness.

We must reach a point where our political choices are determined less by the religion of the candidate and more by the quality of their character, competence, vision and commitment to the Nigerian state. We must reach a point where a Christian can confidently vote for a Muslim without being accused of betraying his faith, and a Muslim can support a Christian without being told that he has abandoned his religion.

That is when religion will begin to return to where it belongs: as a matter of conscience and faith rather than a political weapon.

Perhaps, then, the next great milestone in Nigeria's journey toward nationhood will not be another constitutional amendment, another political arrangement or another agreement among political elites. It may simply be the moment when ordinary Nigerians collectively decide that our differences will no longer be allowed to determine how we see one another.

Nationhood will not be handed to us by politicians. We must grow into it as citizens.

Nworisa Michael is the coordinator of Inter-tribe Community Support Forum and writes from nworisamichael1917@gmail.com 

#TheNworisaDoctrine a body of ideas centred on nation-building, civic responsibility, inclusive governance and African self-determination.

"Many of the Same People Who Mock Approvals Today Will Tomorrow Accuse Government of Acting Without Consultation If Those Approvals Were Never Made." By Nworisa Michael


A rather curious trend has emerged in Kano's political space. 

Every announcement from the Kano State Executive Council is now greeted by a familiar chorus from some quarters of the opposition. Once the word "approved" appears, social media erupts with ridicule. To them, every approval is another opportunity for mockery, another reason to dismiss the administration as one that only "approves" but does nothing. 

Political criticism is not only legitimate; it is indispensable in any democracy. Governments should never be shielded from scrutiny. They must answer difficult questions, defend their priorities and account for the trust reposed in them by the people. 

But there is an important distinction between objective criticism and blanket ridicule. 

Somewhere along the line, we seem to have forgotten that governance is a process. Roads are not built before they are approved. Schools are not constructed before funds are approved. Hospitals are not commissioned before contracts are approved. Committees are not inaugurated before government first identifies a problem, consults relevant stakeholders and approves a framework for addressing it. 

Approval is not the destination; it is the beginning of the journey. 

This is why I find the current trend deeply troubling. Citizens are right to demand implementation. They are right to ask whether approved projects are completed on time. They are right to question abandoned projects, delayed execution and wasteful spending. 

That is accountability. 

But to ridicule every approval simply because it is an approval is to ridicule the very process through which responsible governance is carried out. 

Should a government confronted with the menace of drug abuse refuse to establish a task force because someone may laugh at the approval? 

Should it ignore the challenge of the Almajiri system because constituting a reform committee might become the next social media joke? 

Should it avoid assembling experts to tackle complex societal problems simply to escape political ridicule? Surely not. 

In recent months, the Kano State Government has constituted strategic committees and approved interventions on issues ranging from drug abuse and youth rehabilitation to media policy and the Almajiri reform programme. These are not ribbon-cutting projects designed for instant applause. They are institutional responses to deep-rooted challenges that require planning, consultation and coordination. 

Whether these initiatives eventually succeed is a legitimate subject for public evaluation. But the decision to plan, consult and organise competent minds around pressing problems should never become an object of ridicule. 

Indeed, a government that refuses to plan is a government preparing to fail. 

Ironically, many of the same people who mock approvals today will tomorrow accuse government of acting without consultation if those approvals were never made. 

That contradiction exposes the weakness in this style of opposition politics. 

Opposition is one of democracy's greatest safeguards. It exists to question authority, expose shortcomings, challenge complacency and present better alternatives. A vibrant opposition strengthens governance because it compels those in power to perform. 

However, opposition loses credibility when it abandons objective criticism for blanket ridicule. 

The responsibility of an opposition is not simply to oppose. It is to persuade. It is not merely to mock government but to improve governance through reasoned criticism. The moment analysis gives way to sarcasm, and evidence is replaced by slogans, public discourse suffers. 

The people deserve better than political entertainment masquerading as accountability. 

Another criticism frequently advanced is that H.E Engr. Abba Kabir Yusuf does not communicate enough with the public. Every citizen has the right to desire greater direct engagement from elected leaders, and public communication remains an essential ingredient of democratic governance. 

Yet fairness equally demands that we acknowledge realities where they exist. 

H.E Engr. Abba Kabir Yusuf's style may not revolve around constant personal social media appearances, but that should not be mistaken for silence. Those who follow governance closely know that the administration monitors public opinion and has, on several occasions, responded to issues raised by citizens. 

More significantly, since assuming office, the Honourable Commissioner for Information and Internal Affairs, Hon. Comr. Ibrahim Abdullahi Waiya, has institutionalised a more consistent communication culture by regularly briefing the public on the resolutions of Executive Council meetings. Decisions, approvals and policy directions are routinely communicated through official channels. Beyond that, the Commissioner has sustained engagements with journalists, media organisations, editors, publishers, civil society organisations and communication stakeholders within and outside Kano State. 

That consistency deserves recognition, irrespective of political affiliation. 

This should not be interpreted as suggesting that the administration is beyond criticism. No government is. 

Projects that remain abandoned should be questioned.  Delayed implementation should be questioned. 

Poor policies should be questioned. 

Wasteful expenditure should be questioned. 

Even public officials whose conduct falls below the ethical standards expected of public service should be held accountable. 

That is democracy. But democracy also demands intellectual honesty. 

There is a world of difference between saying, "This project was approved but has not been implemented," and dismissing governance altogether because another approval has been announced. 

The first strengthens accountability. The second weakens public understanding. 

History reminds us that every great achievement begins with preparation. Every flyover easing traffic today was once an approval. Every hospital saving lives today was once an approval. Every school shaping young minds today was once an approval. Every policy that transformed a society was first discussed, debated and approved before implementation began. 

Planning has never been the enemy of development. Failure to implement is. 

As citizens, we should never lower the standard of our political conversations. Let us demand results. Let us insist on transparency. Let us hold every government accountable. Let us measure promises against performance. 

But let us never ridicule planning itself. 

For the day a society begins to mock preparation is the day it unknowingly begins to undermine the very foundation upon which development is built. 

Nigeria does not need an opposition that applauds government, nor does it need a government that fears criticism. It needs citizens mature enough to distinguish between planning and performance, between approval and execution, between propaganda and principle. 

Governments should ultimately be judged by what they deliver. 

But they should never be condemned for taking the constitutional and administrative steps required to deliver it. 

Nworisa Michael is the coordinator of Inter-tribe Community Support Forum and writes from nworisamichael1917@gmail.com

About The Nworisa Doctrine

The Nworisa Doctrine is a growing body of ideas centred on nation-building, civic responsibility, inclusive governance, institutional integrity and African self-determination. It is founded on the belief that lasting national transformation depends not on louder politics, but on stronger institutions, informed citizens and leaders whose principles are greater than their ambitions.

#TheNworisaDoctrine

Beyond Neo-Colonialism: What Does True Independence Look Like? By Nworisa Michael

Monday 13th, July 2026

By Editor 

The day Africa lowered the flags of her colonial masters, we celebrated freedom. We sang new national anthems. We elected African leaders. We raised our own flags before the world. It was a defining moment in our history, one that generations before us had sacrificed greatly to achieve. Yet somewhere along the journey, we quietly assumed that changing the colour of the flag automatically meant changing our destiny. Perhaps that was our first mistake.

Today, many African nations proudly describe themselves as independent states. We have our own constitutions, presidents, governors, ministers and parliaments. We speak with our own voices in international organisations and celebrate our sovereignty every Independence Day. Yet beneath the surface lies a troubling question: are we truly free? We make our own laws, yet many of our economic decisions depend on foreign institutions. We possess some of the richest natural resources on earth, yet many of our people remain trapped in poverty. We have political independence, but have we achieved genuine freedom? That, I believe, is the defining question of our generation.

One of the greatest misconceptions ever told about Africa is that Europe colonised us because they were civilised while we were not. History simply does not support that narrative. Long before European colonial powers arrived on our shores, Africa was home to thriving kingdoms, organised governments, judicial systems, thriving trade routes and remarkable centres of learning. The Kanem-Bornu Empire, the Benin Kingdom, the Oyo Empire, the Sokoto Caliphate, Autonomous Communities in eastern Nigeria, the Mali Empire and the Songhai Empire all testify to a continent that had developed its own political institutions, systems of governance and unique civilisations.

Our forefathers were not conquered because they lacked civilisation. They were conquered because the balance of power had changed. Europe had undergone the Industrial Revolution. They possessed repeating rifles while many African societies still relied on bows and arrows. They had artillery while we had spears and machetes. They had steamships while we travelled largely by canoes and traditional means. They had industries capable of producing modern weapons while many African kingdoms remained dependent on traditional military systems. The difference was not civilisation. It was technology, industrialisation and military advantage.

It is equally important to understand that colonialism was never driven purely by a desire to educate or civilise Africa. The primary objective was economic. Africa's vast deposits of gold, tin, cocoa, palm oil, rubber and countless other natural resources attracted foreign powers seeking wealth for their growing industries. Colonial administrations were largely structured around extraction. Railways were built not necessarily to connect African communities but to transport raw materials from the interior to the ports. The wealth flowed outward while underdevelopment remained behind.

When colonial rule eventually came to an end, many Africans believed exploitation had also ended. Sadly, history tells a different story. Colonialism did not disappear; it merely changed its methods. Yesterday, foreign powers occupied territories through direct political control. Today, influence often comes through debt, trade relationships, technology, multinational corporations, strategic investments and global financial institutions. The chains became less visible, but in many cases, dependence remained. This is what many scholars describe as neo-colonialism.

However, if we truly desire progress, we must also summon the courage to confront ourselves with honesty. It is easy to spend every Independence Day blaming Europe for Africa's condition. It is far more difficult to ask what we have done with the independence handed over to us decades ago. After more than sixty years of self-rule, who bears responsibility when public funds meant for hospitals disappear? Who should answer for schools without teachers, communities without healthcare and young graduates without employment? Who is responsible when elections become competitions of ethnicity instead of contests of ideas? Neo-colonialism may explain many of our external challenges, but it cannot explain every internal failure. A nation cannot continue outsourcing responsibility for its own future.

History also teaches us another important lesson: domination constantly evolves. Yesterday, powerful nations conquered territories with gunboats and rifles. Today, influence increasingly comes through technology, information and innovation. Nations that control artificial intelligence, semiconductor technology, digital infrastructure, satellite communication and data increasingly shape the future of the global economy. Countries that merely consume technology become dependent upon those who create it. Perhaps the next scramble for Africa will not involve soldiers crossing borders. Perhaps it will be fought through algorithms, digital platforms, cyber infrastructure and technological dependence.

If that is true, then our understanding of independence must also evolve. True independence cannot simply mean electing an African president or flying a national flag. True independence begins when a nation possesses the capacity to feed itself, educate its people, produce what it consumes, invest in research, encourage innovation and negotiate with the world from a position of confidence rather than dependency. It means building institutions stronger than personalities. It means rewarding competence above tribe, religion or political loyalty. It means recognising that national development is achieved through ideas, discipline and productivity, not slogans.

As young political leaders, we must resist the temptation to inherit the failures of previous generations. We cannot continue measuring leadership by the length of a convoy, the size of political rallies or the number of years someone occupies public office. Leadership should instead be measured by how many lives become better because someone served. The greatest tragedy would be for Africa to remove foreign masters only to replace them with local ones who govern with the same mentality of exploitation and exclusion.

History assigned our fathers the responsibility of winning political independence. History has given our generation a different assignment. We must fight for intellectual independence, economic independence, technological independence, institutional independence and moral independence. Only then can we truly claim to be free.

Until that day arrives, our flags may be independent, our constitutions may be independent and our governments may be independent, but our future will continue to belong to whoever controls our thinking, our technology and our economy.

Perhaps the struggle of this generation is no longer to fight colonialism.
Our greatest responsibility is to finally complete the work of independence.

©️  Nworisa Michael 

The Nworisa Doctrine is a growing body of ideas that challenges conventional thinking and promotes nation-building, civic responsibility, inclusive governance and African self-determination. #TheNworisaDoctrine